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Abstract  
Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages aims at removing practical obstacles to compensation 
for all victims of infringements of EU antitrust law. Further, the Directive fine-tunes the interplay 
between private damages actions and public enforcement of the EU antitrust rules by the 
Commission and national competition authorities. This paper considers the implications for 
behaviour and efficiency. First, we consider “public enforcement only”, next we look at “private 
damages actions only”, and finally we analyse “the interplay between public enforcement and 
private damages actions”. The consequences depend, inter alia, on the level of harm suffered by 
victims (i.e. customers paying an overcharge), the subjective probabilities of the parties (partly 
determined by jurisprudence), and legal costs.  
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 32nd annual conference of the European Association of Law 
and Economics, Vienna, 17-19 September 2015.  
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1. Introduction 
Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages was signed into law on the 26 November 2014.1 
Member States need to implement the Directive in their legal systems by 27 December 2016. The 
directive brings a number of changes.2 The Directive aims at removing practical obstacles to 
compensation for all victims of infringements of EU antitrust law. The Directive applies to all 
damages actions in the Member States, whether individual or collective. Further, the Directive fine-
tunes the interplay between private damages actions and public enforcement of the EU antitrust 
rules by the Commission and national competition authorities. 
In this paper we analyse this “interplay” between private damages actions and public 
enforcement. We consider “public enforcement only”, “private damages actions only”, and “the 
interplay between public enforcement and private damages actions” respectively.3  
We focus on two questions:  
1. What is the influence on the behaviour of potential cartelists?  
2. What are the welfare implications?  
 
Article 1 Subject matter and scope  
1.  This Directive sets out certain rules necessary to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by 
an infringement of competition law by an undertaking or by an association of undertakings can effectively 
exercise the right to claim full compensation for that harm from that undertaking or association. It sets out 
rules fostering undistorted competition in the internal market and removing obstacles to its proper functioning, 
by ensuring equivalent protection throughout the Union for anyone who has suffered such harm.  
2.  This Directive sets out rules coordinating the enforcement of the competition rules by competition 
authorities and the enforcement of those rules in damages actions before national courts. 
 
Article 3 Right to full compensation  
1. Member States shall ensure that any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an 
infringement of competition law is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm. 
2.  Full compensation shall place a person who has suffered harm in the position in which that person 
would have been had the infringement of competition law not been committed. It shall therefore cover the 
right to compensation for actual loss and for loss of profit, plus the payment of interest.  
3.  Full compensation under this Directive shall not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of 
punitive, multiple or other types of damages. 
                                                          
1
  The directive was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 5 December 2014. 
2
  See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.html 
3
  A generalized mathematical treatment is presented in the Annex, including a discussion of the 
‘seriousness’ of the cartel and pass on in case the customers are suppliers themselves on a downstream market 
(rather than consumers).  
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2. Efficient and inefficient cartels 
In analysing the welfare implications of competition policy, it is important to make a distinction 
between efficient cartels (on balance leading to an increase in welfare) and inefficient cartels (on 
balance leading to a decrease in welfare). Cartels are generally associated with market power, an 
increase in prices and welfare losses. Cartels may, however, lead to economies of scale or economies 
of scope and, therefore, to cost reductions. These efficiency gains might offset the loss due to 
enhanced market power.4  
 
Example: An efficient cartel 
An example of an efficient cartel is shown in Figure 1. Assume that the pre-cartel situation is the 
equilibrium obtained in the case of perfect competition: p = 50 and q = 50. Assume that the 
formation of a cartel leads to a decrease in marginal costs (MCpre = 50 and MCpost = 40). Assume, 
furthermore, that the post-cartel situation yields the monopoly outcome, p = 70 and q = 30. On the 
one hand, the cartel yields a deadweight loss of ½ × (70−50) × (50−30) = 200. On the other hand, the 
cartel leads to costs saving of (50−40)×30 = 300. So, on balance this cartel is welfare enhancing. 
There is also redistribution involved. The price increase leads to a profit for the cartel and harm for 
the customers.5  
 
Figure 1. An efficient cartel 
 
 
                                                          
4
  Cf. Motta (2004: 238). 
5
  Cf. Niels et al. (2011: 337). The idea of weighing the deadweight loss due to price increases and 
efficiency gains due to costs savings was put forward in a seminal paper by Williamson (1968). See also 
Williamson (1977).  
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From an efficiency point of view, preventing inefficient cartels and not deterring efficient cartels 
would be desirable. This appears to be the intention of EU competition policy. Art. 101(1) TFEU 
prohibits agreements between undertakings that prevent, distort or restrict competition. Art. 101(3) 
formulates an exception to this rule for agreements that generate efficiency gains.6 In practice it is 
important to avoid false positives (prohibiting efficient cartels) and false negatives (not prohibiting 
inefficient cartels).7  
Does the directive help in increasing efficiency?  
We consider:  
a. Public enforcement only  
b. Private damages actions only 
c. The interplay between public enforcement and private damages actions 
 
 
3. Public enforcement only 
Public enforcement may influence behaviour by introducing a probability of detection and a fine. We 
start with the standard law and economics model to analyse the consequences.8 In theory, public 
enforcement may result in an optimal outcome. In practice, a number of problems can be expected. 
First, public enforcement may lead to under deterrence. This is the case if the actual probability of 
detection or the level of the fine is “too low”, given the fine. Second, public enforcement does not 
provide compensation for damages suffered by victims. Third, there are costs involved in public 
enforcement. 
Figure 2 presents an overview of the situation. A cartel is faced with probability of detection, 
Pp. In case of detection, the cartel will be fined. The fine is equal to F. Consequently, the expected 
fine is equal to PpF. The cartel will be effectively discouraged if the expected fine is larger than the 
expected profit. The fines imposed by the European Commission and national (European) 
competition authorities are related to total turnover of a cartel member. The maximum fine is 
typically 10% of turnover. 
 
                                                          
6
  Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Official Journal of the European 
Community, 27-04-2004.  
7
  Ideally, competition law yields an efficient outcome. Posner (1999: 11) suggests that this actually is the 
case. “There is a remarkable isomorphism between legal doctrine and economic theory. The isomorphism 
becomes an identity when, as in antitrust (but not only there), the law adopts an explicitly economic criterion 
of legality.”  
8
  Cf. Harrison and Theeuwes (2008: 401).  
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Figure 2. Public enforcement only 
 
 
Example: Public enforcement only  
Consider the example in Figure 3. Assume that the pre-cartel situation is in perfect competition 
equilibrium. The equilibrium price is 40 and the quantity is 60. Assume that the cartel leads to a 
monopoly situation: q = 30 and p = 70. The cartel profit is equal to (70-40)×30 = 900. Assume that the 
fine is 10% of the total revenue, i.e. 0.1×(70×30) = 210. Then: the cartel will be effectively 
discouraged if (1-PP)×900 ≤ PP×210. The critical level of Pp is 81.08%.  
 
 
Figure 3. Example 
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4. Private damages actions only  
By raising prices a cartel may cause harm to “victims”. Victims of infringements of EU antitrust law 
may claim damages. As explained in Directive 2014/104/EU victims have a right to claim full 
compensation: “Full compensation shall place a person who has suffered harm in the position in 
which that person would have been had the infringement of competition law not been committed.”9 
Under ideal-typical circumstances, the principle of full compensation will lead to an efficient 
outcome.10 In reality, the deterrent effect will depend on the circumstances. To analyse the 
consequences we use the so-called “optimism model”.11 The analysis is based on three questions:  
1. If a cartel is formed and prices are raised, may the victims credibly threaten to bring suit?  
2. In case of a credible threat: what is the cartel’s best option: making a settlement offer which 
is acceptable to the victim or allowing things to develop into a trial?  
3. Given the answers to the first two questions: is the formation of a cartel effectively 
discouraged?  
 
Ad 1. Credible threat?  
Assume that cartel C has caused harm H, H > 0, to victim V. V wants to hold the cartel liable. Let V’s 
subjective probability of success in a trial be given by Pv, 0  Pv  1. If V prevails in the trial, the cartel 
has to fully compensate harm H. We assume that the European Continental rule for allocating legal 
costs applies, implying that the loser in a trial not only has to pay his own legal costs, but also those 
of the winner.12 Total legal costs are given by K. Then, V’s expected net benefit of litigation is equal 
to: PvH−(1−Pv)K. V may credibly threaten to bring suit, if PvH−(1−Pv)K > 0.  
 
Ad 2. Settlement of trial? 
If the victim can credibly threaten to bring suit, then the cartel may try to settle the dispute out of 
court. In order to be acceptable for V, the settlement amount must be (at least) equal to V’s 
expected net benefit of litigation. If the cartel does not make an acceptable settlement offer, the 
parties will end up in court. Let the cartel’s subjective probability of prevailing in court be Pc. Then 
the cartel’s expected costs of litigation are equal to (1-Pc)(H+K). A settlement will be obtained if 0 < 
PvH−(1−Pv)K ≤ (1-Pc)(H+K).
13 If there is room for a settlement, we assume that the cartel makes a 
settlement offer that is just acceptable for the victim, i.e. the settlement amount S is equal to the 
victim’s expected net benefit of litigation: S= PvH−(1−Pv)K.  
 
                                                          
9
  Directive 2014/104/EU, art. 3. 
10
  An extensive analysis of the consequences of liability can be found in Shavell (1987).  
11
  Seminal paper in the field are: Gould (1973), Landes (1971), Posner (1973)and Shavell (1982). The 
model in this paper is based on the model presented in Van Velthoven and Van Wijck (2001). 
12
  A distinction can be made between the American and the Continental rule for allocation legal costs. 
Under the American rule each party bears its own costs. Under the Continental (or British) rule the losing party 
bears all the costs. See for instance Shavell (1982: 59-60) or: Van Wijck and Van Velthoven (2000).  
13
  Only if PV and PC add up to a number larger than 1, the conflict may lead to a trial. For that reason, the 
model is called “the optimism model”.  
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Ad 3. Cartel or no cartel?  
The question of whether the formation of the cartel will be effectively discouraged depends on 
whether the cartel’s expected profits are larger or smaller than the costs associated with a 
settlement of a trial. More specifically, the cartel will be effectively discouraged if the victim can 
credibly threaten to bring suit and the expected profit is smaller than min [PvH−(1−Pv)K, (1-Pc)(H+K)].  
 
Figure 4. Private damages actions only 
 
 
 
Example: Private damages actions only  
Assume: PV = 0.8, PC = 0.2, H = 900 and K = 200. Then the answers to the three questions are:  
1. Credible threat, since 0.8×900 – 0.2×100 = 700 > 0.  
2. Settlement, since 700 < (1−0.2)×(900+100). 
3. Cartel, since 700 < 900.  
NB: If it is perfectly clear that the victim will prevail, i.e. PV =1 and PC = 0, then the outcome will be 
“No cartel”. The reason is that there would be a settlement equal to the profit (900): the formation 
of an inefficient cartel will be effectively discouraged.  
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5. Interplay between public enforcement and private damages actions 
Both public enforcement and private damages actions may influence behaviour. We analyse the 
interplay between both systems and investigate the consequences for behaviour and welfare. In this 
we assume a specific sequence: public enforcement is assumed to precede private damages actions. 
More specifically, we assume the sequences depicted in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Interplay between public enforcement and private damages actions 
 
 If public enforcement leads to the conclusion that there is no infringement of competition 
law, than private damages actions are virtually impossible. That is: the probability that a 
“victim” will prevail in a trial is zero. Consequently, the victim cannot credibly threaten to 
bring suit.  
 If public enforcement leads to the conclusion that there is an infringement of competition 
law, than the probability that a “victim” will prevail in a trial is positive. Depending on the 
circumstances, the victim may credibly threaten to bring suit and this will result in a 
settlement or a trial.  
 The possibility of private damages actions, that may take place after public enforcement of 
antitrust law, may increase the deterrent function of antitrust law. Whether or not this is the 
case, depends on the circumstances. More specifically, it depends on whether the victim can 
credibly threaten to bring suit.  
 
The question of whether the possibility of private damages actions leads to an increase of the 
deterrent function of competition law depends on the influence of expected costs. And this depends 
on whether victims may credibly threaten to bring suit:  
 If PvH−(1−Pv)K > 0, then expected costs are: P
p{F + min [PvH−(1−Pv)K, (1-Pc)(H+K)]}  
 If PvH−(1−Pv)K ≤ 0, then expected costs are: P
pF (expected costs in case of public enforcement 
only). 
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Example: Public enforcement and private damages actions   
Public enforcement generates a probability of detection, Pp, and a fine F. Assume PP = 0.5 and F = 
210. Private damages actions are characterized by PV, PC, H and K. Assume, as before, PV = 0.8, PC = 
0.2, H = 900 and K = 200, implying a settlement of 700. The combination of public enforcement and 
private damages actions lead to expected costs: 0.5 × (210 + 700) = 455. In this case, the formation of 
a cartel will be effectively discouraged, since the expected profit (0.5 ×900 = 450) is smaller than the 
expected costs (455). Note that the cartel will be effectively discouraged if (1-PP)×900 ≤ PP×910. The 
critical level of Pp is 49.72%. Consequently, the critical level of PP is much lower than in the case of 
public enforcement only (81.08%).  
 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
Directive 2014/104/EU intends to remove practical obstacles to compensation for all victims of 
infringements of EU antitrust law. In general, liability rules do not only serve a compensation goal.14 
These rules may also influence behaviour and efficiency. In this paper we focussed on implication for 
behaviour and efficiency. We discussed a number of implications.  
1. Due to an improvement of opportunities for private damages actions potential cartelists may 
be faced with an increase in expected costs. Therefore, they may refrain from entering into a 
cartel. Consequently, the deterrent function of competition law may be strengthened.  
2. If an improvement of opportunities for private damages actions leads to an increase in 
potential cartelist’s expected costs, we may observe a decrease in the critical level of Pp (the 
minimum probability of detection that leads to deterrence). Consequently, a decrease in 
public enforcement costs may be obtained. 
3. We can expect an increase in the number of conflicts leading to trials and, therefore, an 
increase in private enforcement costs.  
The implications of the possibility of private damages actions depend on a number of factors:  
1. The level of harm suffered by victims (customers paying an overcharge) is a first factor. For 
relatively low levels of harm, victims may not credibly threaten to bring suit, implying that 
the possibility of private damages actions effectively had no consequences at all.  
2. The subjective probabilities of the parties constitute a second factor. Characteristic for the 
“optimism model” is that a necessary condition for a trial to occur is that parties collectively 
overestimate their chances. The subjective probabilities are partly determined by 
jurisprudence. The development of jurisprudence may lead to a convergence of subjective 
probabilities and, therefore, to an increase in settlement rates. 
3. The level of legal costs affects whether a victim may credibly threaten to bring suit and 
whether a dispute will lead to a settlement or a trial. Therefore, the level of legal costs has an 
influence of behaviour of potential cartelists and efficiency.  
 
                                                          
14
  Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock (1996: 5-8) distinguish three objectives of the tort system: deterrence, 
compensation and corrective justice.  
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In the preceding sections we made a number of restrictive assumptions. Relaxing these assumptions 
yields a number of potential extensions of the analysis.  
 We treated the (potential) cartel as a single actor. This actor decides whether or not to act as 
a cartel. Furthermore, this actor decides on paying damages. A potential extension would be to 
consider the individual decisions of parties to enter into a cartel. “Where several undertakings 
infringe the competition rules jointly, as in the case of a cartel, it is appropriate to make provision for 
those co-infringers to be held jointly and severally liable for the entire harm caused by the 
infringement”.15 We could, therefor, investigate the incentives for individual parties if joint and 
several liability is introduced.16  
We treated the victim as a single actor (threatening to bring suit). In fact, if a cartel decides 
to increase prices, there will generally be a large number of victims. We could analyse the 
implications, for instance by studying the consequences of collective action and mass disputes.  
We did not discuss the possibility of pass-on. Pass-on effects may influence the amount of 
harm suffered by customers. “When an injured party has reduced its actual loss by passing it on, 
entirely or in part, to its own purchasers, the loss which has been passed on no longer constitutes 
harm for which the party that passed it on needs to be compensated”.17 It is possible to consider 
pass-on and discuss the relation with the prevailing market conditions.18  
                                                          
15
  Directive 2014/104/EU, consideration 37. 
16  Cf. Kornhauser (2013).  
17
  Directive 2014/104/EU, consideration 17. 
18
  Cf. Verboven and Van Dijk (2009), RBB Economics (2012, 2014). In the Annex it will be shown that the 
possibility of pass-on may influence the minimum deterrent probability. 
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Annex 
 
A.  Assumptions: Perfect competition, customers are consumers 
Assumptions:19  
1. Constant marginal costs of production are equal for each competitor and equal to c 
2. Textbook static cartel (= monopoly) 
3. Linear demand 
Therefore the competitive price is equal to c and profits are individually zero. 
The cartel price is the monopoly price as determined by the same demand curve as for perfect 
competition and by marginal costs of c. Cartel profits are (pM – c)qM, with pM = monopoly price and 
qM is monopoly quantity. 
Define  m= (pM – c)/ pM 
This is the Lerner-index. This index is called the ‘overcharge’ in damages litigations cases.20 
Cartel turnover is pMqM=O. 
Cartel profits can therefore be rewritten as  mO: 
mO=[(pM – c)/ pM]× pMqM= (pM – c)qM 
Cartel damages in damages litigations are typically defined as the distributional effects of the cartel: 
a deadweight loss may be considered as damages, however are harder to prove. Therefore mO also 
determines damages in private litigations cases (in our model). 
As customers are consumers, there is no ‘pass on’. Pass on means that a customer from a cartel may 
be able to increase his own prices and passes on (part of) the cartel’s price increase. This customer 
therefore does not suffer damages to the extent that cartel input price increases have been passed 
on by the customer’s higher selling price of its product.  
Including the deadweight loss in the damages would imply including 0.5mO, so that total damages 
would amount to 1.5 mO. We will only discuss the distributional damages. 
B. Public enforcement probability leading to deterence 
The public enforcement probability of cartel detection is Pp. We assume that private litigation is 
possible only when a cartel was publicly detected.  
                                                          
19
  Perfect competition is assumed for simplicity. Alternatively Cournot or Bertrand competition could 
have been assumed (Bertrand competition with homogeneous or heterogeneous products). 
20
  See e.g. Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_guide_en.pdf), p. 128. 
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A deterrent effect on cartel behaviour exists when the expected profits of the cartel are lower than 
the expected costs. Expected costs are determined by the detection probability, the competition 
authority’s fine and the effects of private litigation.  
Effects of private litigations are denoted in general by E: E can be either a settlement amount or 
damages compensation as ordered by the court.  
Define all costs of a private law suit by K. These costs include the defendant’s and the victim’s costs 
of litigation to be paid by the party that will lose the law suit. 
Assumption: E in case of a law suit will equal damages mO plus K. 
A competition authority’s fine is supposed to be the maximum possible, i.e. 0.1O.  
A cartel will be deterred if: 
(1-PP)mO ≤ PP(0.1O + E), 
or  
(1-PP)m ≤ PP(0.1+ E/O) 
or  
𝑃𝑃 ≥  
𝑚
0.1 + 𝑚 + 𝐸 𝑂⁄
 
If damages are fully compensated and K would be zero, then E/O = m 
It follows that: 
(1)   𝑃𝑃 ≥  
𝑚
0.1 + 2𝑚
 
 
C. Influence of litigation 
Cartel victims (V) are supposed to be one party with one claim equal to mO.  
V’s subjective probability of winning a law suit is PV and C’s (the cartel’s) subjective probability of 
winning a law suit is PC.  
Note that C’s subjective probability of winning a law suit PC may be seen as C’s subjective guess about 
V’s probability of losing the case, so that the higher PC, the higher the probability that V will lose 
according to C, independent (generally speaking) of V’s subjective probability of winning or losing the 
case. It follows that in general:21 
                                                          
21  Of course, subjective probabilities are formed by information, so that in case of perfect 
information about actually losing or winning it must follow that PC+PV = 1.  
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PC+PV ≠ 1 
V and C are assumed to be risk neutral. 
V’s expected gains from a law suit are 
PVmO – (1– PV)K 
If PVmO – (1– PV)K ≤ 0, then V cannot credibly threaten to go to court, hence a settlement will not be 
reached, so that E=0. 
This means that the deterrence formula becomes: 
(2)  𝑃𝑃 ≥  
𝑚
0,1 + 𝑚
 
If 𝑃𝑃is equal to the right hand side in case of (1) or (2), it is called the minimum probability of 
deterrence.  
Define  
P(1)(m)= 
𝑚
0,1+2𝑚
   
P(2)(m)= 
𝑚
0,1+𝑚
   
P(i)(m), i = 1,2 are increasing concave functions of m, starting at the origin and P(1)(m) < P(2)(m) for all 
m > 0.  
For m = 1 (the largest value possible), P(1)(1) = 10/21 en P(2)(1) = 10/11. 
Figure A.1 shows these two curves. 
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Figure A.1. Minimum deterrent probabilities as a function of overcharge 
 
 
P(1)(m) is the minimum deterrent probability if damages are fully compensated with zero litigations 
costs K.  
P(2)(m) is the minimum deterrent probability in case of administrative fines only.  
The necessary condition for damages compensation is  
PVmO – (1–PV)K > 0 
or 
𝑃𝑉 ≥  
𝐾
𝑚𝑂 + 𝐾
 
Define K/O = k that measures litigations costs as a fraction of cartel turnover. A ‘large’ (high turnover) 
cartel implies lower k. 
So: 
(3) 𝑃𝑉  ≥  
𝑘
𝑚 + 𝑘
 
 
The potential settlement amount S will then be 
S=PVmO – (1–PV)K ≥ 0 
or 
S/O = PVm – (1–PV)k ≥ 0 
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If this amount is lower than the expected outcome of a lawsuit, settlement will follow: 
(1–PC)(mO+K) ≥ S 
or 
PC(m+k) ≥ PVm – (1–PV)k 
or 
(4)  𝑃𝑉 + 𝑃𝐶 ≤  1 +
𝑘
𝑚 + 𝑘
 
Because of (3):  
𝑃𝐶 ≤  1 +
𝑘
𝑚 + 𝑘
− 𝑃𝑉 ≤ 1 
If C or V (or both) thinks that the probability of winning a lawsuit will be sufficiently low (expressed 
by (4)) a settlement will follow. 
 
Settlement  
If settled: 
E/O=S/O= PVm – (1-PV)k 
The deterrent probability is defined by  
𝑃𝑃 ≥  
𝑚
0.1 + 𝑚 + 𝐸 𝑂⁄
 
Define the lowest value as the minimum deterrent probability: 
𝑃(𝑚) =  
𝑚
0.1 + 𝑚 + 𝐸 𝑂⁄
 
Define P(m) in case of settlement as 
𝑃𝑆(𝑚) =  
𝑚
0.1 + 𝑚 + 𝑃𝑉𝑚 – (1 − 𝑃𝑉)𝑘
 
or 
𝑃𝑆(𝑚) =  
𝑚
0.1 + 𝑚 + 𝑃𝑉(𝑚 + 𝑘) –  𝑘
 
And 
(5) m ≥ PVm – (1–PV)k ≥ 0 
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Law suit 
If a law suit follows:  
(1–PC)(mO+K) ≤ S 
So 
E = (1–PC)(mO+K) 
Or 
E/O =(1–PC)(m+k) 
De minimum deterrent probability in case of a trial equals  
𝑃𝐿(𝑚) =  
𝑚
0.1 + 𝑚 + (1 − 𝑃𝐶)(𝑚 + 𝑘)
 
m ≥ PVm – (1–PV)k ≥ (1–PC)(m+k) ≥ 0 
So 
1 − 𝑃𝐶 ≤  𝑃𝑉 −  
𝑘
𝑚 + 𝑘
 
Also, because of (3): 
𝑃𝑉 −  
𝑘
𝑚 + 𝑘
≥ 0 
If PV = k/(m+k), then PC = 1 
If PV = 1, then (1–PC) ≤ m/(m+k) so that the lowest value for PC is k/(m+k), or  
(6) 1 ≥ PC ≥ k/(m+k) 
in which case 𝑃𝐿(𝑚) becomes P(1)(m)= 
𝑚
0.1+2𝑚
 
Corollaries 
a. 0 ≤ E/O ≤ m 
 
Proof: E/O ≥ 0 follows trivially 
Suppose E/O > m: 
- if settled, a contradiction follows because of (5) 
- in case of trial: E/O = (1–PC)(m+k) > m, so that Pc < k/(m+k), which is a contradiction because 
of (6) 
 
b. For all m≥0: P(2)(m) ≥ P(m) ≥ P(1)(m) 
 
Proof: P(m) is a continuous, decreasing function of E/O; if E/O=0, then P(m) = P(2)(m) and if 
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E/O = m, P(m)= P(1)(m). 
 
c. P(m) = P(1)(m) if and only if 
PV=1 and (1–PC ) ≥ m/(m+k); 
 
Proof of  P(m) = P(1)(m) → PV=1 and (1–PC) ≥ m/(m+k)  
First assume 𝑃𝑆(𝑚)= P(1)(m), then it must be that PV=1, but also (because of the settlement) 
(1–PC) ≥ m/(m+k). 
Now assume that 𝑃𝑅(𝑚)= P(1)(m), then (1–PC)=m/(m+k), but because of a trial PVm – (1–PV)k 
≥ (1–PC)(m+k)=m, hence PV(m+k) –k≥m, consequently PV=1. 
 
Proof of PV=1 and (1–PC) ≥ m/(m+k) → P(m) = P(1)(m) 
If PV=1 and (1–PC) ≥ m/(m+k) a settlement follows, so 𝑃𝑆(𝑚)= P(1)(m) 
 
d. P(m) = P(1)(m) and k=0 then (1–PC) =PV=1.  
Proof: combine corollary c. and k=0. 
Corollary c. means that maximal deterrence will only be possible if and only if V knows with certainty 
that a trial will be won, and C is insufficiently sure to win the trial. C will then settle and trial costs will 
be avoided, so that full compensation will be paid. 
 
D.  Taking account of ‘gravity’ of the cartel 
We assumed above that fines are always equal to 0.1O. However, a cartel may not be effective in 
realizing monopoly profits and fines may be adjusted downward according to the ‘seriousness’ or 
gravity of the cartel.  
Assume that the cartel price is p, so that pM ≥ p ≥ c and m now denotes (p-c)/p rather than the 
monopoly overcharge, that will now be denoted by mM = (pM – c)/ pM. 
Hence, for pM ≥ p ≥ c:22  
mM ≥ m ≥ 0 
Gravity may be captured by the ‘fine percentage’ 
¥(m)=0,1m/ mM 
If m = 0, the fine is 0 and if m = mM the fine is 0.1O.  
The minimum deterrent probability in case of a settlement becomes: 
𝑃𝑆(𝑚) =  
𝑚
0.1
𝑚𝑀
𝑚 + 𝑚 + 𝑃𝑉𝑚 − (1 − 𝑃𝑉)𝑘
 
                                                          
22
 Note that m is an increasing concave function of p. 
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𝑃𝑉𝑚 − (1 − 𝑃𝑉)𝑘 ≥ 0, in case of settlement, or  
𝑚𝑀 ≥ 𝑚 ≥  
(1 − 𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
≥ 0 
Assume  𝑚 =  
(1−𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
  then  
𝑃𝑆 (
(1 − 𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
) =  
1
0.1
𝑚𝑀
+ 1
 
Also, for 
𝑚𝑀 ≥ 𝑚 ≥  
(1 − 𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
≥ 0 
PS(m) is a decreasing function in m, so that the minimum deterrent probability becomes smaller the 
more serious is the cartel (given settlement): 
(1 − 𝑃𝐶) ≥  𝑃𝑉 −
𝑘
𝑚+𝑘
≥ 0 for all m ≥ 
(1−𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
≥ 0 
In case of a trial: 
𝑃𝐿(𝑚) =  
𝑚
0.1
𝑚𝑀
𝑚 + 𝑚 + (1 − 𝑃𝐶)(𝑚 + 𝑘)
 
 
For 𝑚 =  
(1−𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
≥ 0: 
 
𝑃𝐿 (
(1 − 𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
) =  
1
0.1
𝑚𝑀
+ 1 +
(1 − 𝑃𝐶)
(1 − 𝑃𝑉)
 
PL(m) is an increasing function in m.
23 
E. Pass on: Customers are downstream suppliers 
Assumptions: 
- Customers are price takers; 
- The cartel increases the price to customers; 
We distinguish two situations: 
a. Customers of the cartel are suppliers on a perfectly competitive market; 
b. One or more customers are a monopolist as a supplier on the downstream market.24 
                                                          
23
 Note that P(m
M
) ≥ 𝑃 (
(1−𝑃𝑉)𝑘
𝑃𝑉
), using (1-𝑃𝑉) ≤ m/(m+k). 
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Ad a. 
Customers’ marginal costs just consist of their suppliers’ prices. Suppliers have marginal costs c. 
Denote the customers’ purchase price as p, then without a suppliers cartel: 
p=c 
Customers’ own selling prices on the downstream market are denoted by pD, so in case of perfect 
competition downstream: 
pD = p = c 
In case of the cartel: 
p = pM > c 
Hence: 
pD = p = pM 
The cartel’s customers therefore do not have damages, because these are passed on completely to 
their own customers. 
Ad b.  
If a customer is a monopolist himself downstream, the cartel will lead to double marginalization.  
Purchase price p=c before cartel will lead to the same monopoly price on the downstream market as 
determined in the first section above, now denoted by  pDM.  
Assume that final demand is: 
pD = -δq + γ 
then demand upstream is determined by 
p = -2δq + γ = -αq + γ 
The cartel price becomes  
pM = (γ+c)/2 
The selling price downstream is 
pDMV = (3γ+c)/4 
Without the cartel, the downstream price would have been: 
pDM = (γ+c)/2 
The difference is  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
24
 At least the customer has some market power. 
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pDMV – p
DM = (3γ+c)/4 - (γ+c)/2 = (γ-c)/4 > 0 
The difference in the purchase price is 
pM - c= (γ+c)/2 –c = (γ-c)/2 
The overcharge is m = (pM – c)/ pM 
Part of this overcharge is passed on to downstream consumers: (pDMV – p
DM)/ pM so the actual 
damage to the direct customer of the cartel is: 
m -  (pDMV – p
DM)/ pM = [(γ-c)/2 -  (γ-c)/4]/ pM = [(γ-c)/4]/ pM = ½[(γ-c)/2]/ pM =  ½m. 
The customer now has lower profits, too, that may count as damages. This is easiest to see in a graph 
(Figure A.2). 
Before the cartel profits for the suppliers upstream are zero (p=c), but due to market power on the 
downstream market, customers of the cartel (suppliers on the downstream market), the selling price 
to consumers is pDM = (γ+c)/2. Profits to the downstream suppliers are equal to area B+C in Figure 
A.2. 
 Figure A.2. Overcharge and pass on 
 
 
After a cartel is established, the price to customers becomes pM = (γ+c)/2 (which is equal to the price 
for consumers in the absence of a cartel). This higher purchasing price for the cartels’ customers will 
lead to the higher selling price to consumers downstream of pDMV = (3γ+c)/4. Profits for the cartel’s 
customers are now equal to area A in Figure A.2. 
The overcharge damages are equal to area B, but there is a loss of profit due to the output decrease 
of area C. Part of both losses are recaptured by the profits as determined by area A (pass on effect).  
21 
 
 
The minimum deterrent probability will decrease (because damages will be lower). There will be less 
private damages litigations as a consequence and the probability of settlements will decrease as 
compared to the results of the first section.  
 
  
22 
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